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Summary  findings
Private capital flows to Central and Eastern Europe and  determinant of private flows to the region. Private flows
the former Soviet UInion  have taken off in recent years.  also have responded positively to the buildup of reserves
Foreign direct investment was the most important such  (a proxy for improvements in perceived
flow from 1991-97,  but since 1993 short-term debt and  creditworthiness) and to prospective nmembership  in the
portfolio  flows have also been important.  European Union (reflecting greater economic integration
The increase in these potentially more volatile short-  with the West and a greater corrmmitment  to reform).
term flows raises some questions about sustainability and  Official flows have been associated with the financing
vulnerability,  of fiscal deficits and appear to have led, rather than
Perhaps more than  in other developing countries,  followed, countries'  reform efforts.
reform efforts appear to be the most important
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Paper prepared for the  NBER-Study: CAPITAL INFLOWS to  EMERGING MARKETS,
organized by Sebastian  Edwards.  We would like to thank the discussant,  Michael  Dooley, and
other participants  in the pre-conference  and conference,  Ricardo Martin, Frank Lysy, Marcelo
Selowsky  and participants  in a World  Bank  workshop  for useful comments.1.  Introduction and background
Capital flows to Central and Eastem Europe and the Former Soviet Union (CEE/FSU)
represent a relatively small, albeit growing share of capital flows to developing countries.  Taken
all flows together, total net flows to these 25 countries were about $44 billion  in 1996 (and a
preliminary figure of $57 billion for 1997),' or about 1/8 of aggregate net flows to all developing
countries.  These countries accounted, however, for about 20 and 22 percent respectively of all
developing countries' GDP and exports in 1996.  As a fraction of their GDP, total inflows were
consequaently  smaller than for many other developing countries, and averaged about 5.4 percent
over the 1990-96 period.  Taking debt service and capital flight are taken into account, resource
inflows were much lower and even negative to some countries (capital flight from Russia alone
has been estimated at some $50 billion for 1992-96).
The lower level of capital flows to these countries occurred during a period when global
capital  flows  were  very  buoyant.  Private  capital  flows  to  developing  countries  increased
dramatically during the 1990s, especially foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio  equity
investmient. While flows to the CEE/FSU have also been growing fast-for  example, portfolio
and  foreign  direct investment  flows increased from  $1.4 billion  in  1990 to  $23.5  billion  in
1996-between  them they still only attract about 15 percent of total private capital flows to all
developing countries in 1996.2  In  1996, FDI to CEE/FSU, for example, was only $14 billion,
equivalent to the total amount received by Malaysia and Mexico in that year.  The distribution of
FDI flows has also been highly uneven.  Over the 1992-1996 period, Russia and the Visegrad
countries  (Czech Republic,  Slovak Republic,  Poland and Hungary) received the bulk  of FDI
flows, while many other countries in the region are still all but untouched by FDI.
The relatively  still low  level of,  especially private, capital  flows, reflects  the  special
nature of the economic development processes in these countries.  Several factors are important.
First, CE]E/FSU  are all transition economies.  This meant, for one that market reforms did not get
underway until the end of the 1980s for most of CEE-with  the notable exceptions of Hungary
and Poland-and  until 1991 for the FSU.  The transition process also influenced the nature and
composition of the capital flows.  In particular, early on in the transition the capital flows were
mainly liscally driven and often from official sources.  Annual net flows of official development
finance--including  official development assistance (grants and official concessional loans) and
official non-concessional loans-represented  about 40 percent of total net flows in 1990-96 and
over  100 percent in  1990-91 (as private net flows were negative in those years).  This reflected
the sharp deterioration of fiscal revenues at the onset of the transition process and the lack of
creditworthiness  of  some  countries.  Associated with  this  process  were  low  private  capital
inflows, and, as mentioned, for some countries substantial amounts of capital flight.  The low
level of private inflows was due to a variety of factors, including partial and incomplete reforms
or an uncertain commitment to reform in most countries, high political  and social costs of the
transition  process  itself, as well as high levels of corruption and political  instability  (several
I  Excluding  grants,  the total  amount  of net flows amounted  US$ 41 billion  in 1996.
2  FDI and portfolio  flows  to all developing  countries  in 1996  were $155 billion.
2countries in the FSU have been affected by civil wars).  Many countries in CEE also lost
financing and aid from the Soviet Union-they  had received  large aid, including  through above
market export prices and below  market import (especially  energy)  prices, from the Soviet Union
(World Bank, 1992),  but these flows essentially ceased in 1989-implying a larger financing
need for their governments.
In more recent years, there has been a more rapid inflow of private capital, as reform
efforts have consolidated  and economic prospects improved and, for some countries, as EU-
integration  became a possibility for the near future. For some countries,  short-term  capital has
recently become an important source of external financing.  Since most countries have been
"late-comers"  to the phenomenon  of large private capital inflows, they have not experienced
much of the overheating  phenomena  which have affected  other developing  countries  in the past
(Latin America)  and recently  (East Asia). The main exceptions  indeed were precisely some of
the earlier  and faster  reformers  like  Hungary,  Poland,  Czech  Republic  and Estonia.
At the same  time, the transition  to a market  economy  is far from complete  for most of the
economies  in the region. Distortions  in factor markets are still prevalent and the institutional
development  in areas crucial  to beneficial  financial  integration-particularly the legal system and
financial  sector-is  still  limited, especially  in many of countries  of the FSU. Deficiencies,  which
in other developing countries  have been associated  with subsequent  problems, including poor
resource allocation and financial crises, are thus still prevalent in many transition economies.
By tackling these issues now, these countries could presumably stand to  gain more of the
benefits and less of the risks associated  with more financial  integration  and large private capital
flows.
This paper investigates  the amounts,  type and sources of capital flows to these countries.
It tries  to determine  the motivation  of the various sources  of capital flows, distinguishing  global
and country-specific  factors. The paper provides estimates of the (econometric)  relationships
between,  on one hand, the different  kinds of capital flows and, on the other hand, the reform
process, macroeconomic  fundamentals  and performance,  and external factors.  As the history of
capital flows to CEEIFSU  is short, historical  analysis  has, however, significant  limitations and
econometric  estimation is difficult.  Lessons from experiences  of other countries with private
capital  flows may, however,  be applied  to these countries,  when taking into account  their special
characteristics.
The paper is organized  as follows. Section  II briefly  describes  the facts on capital flows
to these countries.  Section III discusses important links and relationships  between macro-
economic  variables  and the capital  flows,  including  some  of the basic motivations  and causes for
capital flows.  Section  IV describes  and analyzes  the policy framework  and policy responses in
those  countries  that received  the bulk of capital  flows. Econometric  tests are presented  in section
V, while section VI discusses the issues which may be arising with capital flows in these
countries  in the future and provides  some  conclusions.
32.  The facts on capital  flows to Central  and Eastern  Europe  and Former  Soviet  Union
We  start with  providing some simple raw statistics  for the various  capital flows.  In
principle, one can distinguish capital flows by destination (e.g., public versus private); by type
(e.g., debt, of which long-term and short-term, FDI, portfolio, of which bonds and equity) and by
origin (e.g., commercial, i.e., private versus official creditors).  One can also combine the three
distinctions, e.g., by splitting debt-type flows into public and private debt, with the latter further
into long and short, and by origin, e.g., commercial versus official.  For our purposes, and given
the data we have at hand and the patterns in capital flows we observe, we create five categories
of capital flows: public debt (official) flows; commercial long-term (LT) debt flows; commercial
short-term  (ST)  debt  flows;  FDI-flows;  and  portfolio  (bond  and  equity)  flows.  For  some
purposes,  it would  be  useful to  further split commercial debt flows into  those  going  to  the
banking system versus to other sectors of the economy, but it turns out that this can not be done
for most of the countries given the data available.  Our focus is on net flows; however, while we
occasionally also discuss "capital flight" (other than that captured through short-term flows), we
do not net out capital flight from our net flow measures.  We group countries in two regions:
Central Europe and the Baltics; and the rest of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. 3
The group  of countries  in Central  Europe is relatively  homogeneous.  The second  category
groups countries with more diverse economic characteristics.  Data for individual countries are
reported in Annex 1, where we provide both absolute figures and figures relative to GDP. 4
Descriptive statistics for the different types of flows for all countries (means, medians,
standard deviations of flows) are provided in Table  1. Table 2  describes the composition  of
capital flows by source (private and official) and by type (long-term, short-term, portfolio and
FDI). Total capital flows rose from around $1 billion in 1990 to $57 billion in  1997.  Pooling
together all observations (by country and by year) and measuring them as a share of GDP, the
largest types of flows during the 1992-96 period were official debt flows and FDI (on average,
respectively  2.7 percent and  2 percent  of GDP), followed by  portfolio flows (0.4 percent  of
GDP).  Of all  these  flows,  the  highest standard  deviation was  for  official  flows (standard
deviation of 3.6 percent of GDP). The following other stylized facts can be observed. 5
First, the share of official flows has declined sharply over the period (Figure  1). At the
beginning  of  the  transition,  official flows  increased  sharply,  with  bilateral  and  multilateral
sources accounting for most of the flows.  In 1992, as some of the transition economies regained
access to international credit markets, private flows begun to exceed official flows and by 1997
they accounted for 73 percent of total flows.  This development is not different from what has
3  The CEE and Baltics  country group includes  Albania,  Bulgaria,  Croatia, Czech Republic,  Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, FYR Macedonia,  Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia  and Slovenia. The FSU country group
irtcludes  Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Belarus, Georgia,  Kazakstan,  Kyrgyz Republic,  Moldova,  Russia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan  and Ukraine.
4  We had to be careful for the exchange  rate used in calculating  dollar GDP given the large changes in real
exchange  rate  for this period. Some  smoothing  was necessary,  which  was done using  the World  Bank Atlas $-
GDP figures.
5  Sobol, 1996,  also  highlights  the rapid  surge  in private  capital  flows  to Central  and Eastem Europe.
4been observed  in other developing countries, but in  these transition  economies the change in
composition appears to have occurred more swiftly.  The reduced reliance on official flows has
been more marked in Central Europe and the Baltics than in the FSU.  While FDI and portfolio
flows were  large  in  Central Europe  and the  Baltics already  in  1991-92, they only  acquired
significance in the FSU after  1994.  This is consistent with the onset  of earlier reforms and
improved access to international capital markets of Central Europe and the Baltics.
Second, there has been a rapid surge of short-tern  capital flows (short-term debt plus
portfolio flows) from about $1 billion in  1991-92 to $12 billion in 1996-97-with  the share in
total flows increasing from 5 percent to about one-quarter (Figure 2). The surge in short-term
flows could be a source of concern for policymakers, as short-tern  flows could be associated
with higher volatility.  This may be especially so for those countries that received the bulk of
short-term flows: during 1993-96, the largest recipients were Hungary, Czech Republic, Russia,
Slovakia, Ukraine and Slovenia, with these countries in total receiving over 90% of all short-term
flows.
Third, the  destination of private capital flows has been heavily  concentrated. 6 A few
countries, Russia, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, accounted together  for about 80
percent of private capital flows to the region (Figure 3). The above four countries, along with a
second  group  of  countries-Romania,  Kazakstan,  Ukraine,  Slovenia,  Slovakia,  Lithuania,
Estonia and Croatia-accounted  for about 98 percent of all private capital flows to the region.
The concentration for FDI was even higher.  Two countries, Poland and Hungary, for example,
received over 50 percent of the 1992-96 cumulative FDI to the region ($46 billion).
And fourth, official capital flows (excluding flows from IMF) have also been heavily
concentrated, although mostly in a different set of countries than private flows.  On a cumulative
basis over 1992-96, five countries (Romania, Russia, Kazakstan, Ukraine and Bulgaria) received
over 75 percent of all official flows (Figure 4).  Some of the earlier large recipients of official
flows subsequently repaid large amounts of official debt arid, thus, on a net cumulative basis the
significance  of  official  financing  for these  countries  is  somewhat understated.  Russia  and
Poland, for example, received around $2.4 billion  in official financing in  1993-94 and repaid
over $3 billion in 1996.
3.  Linkages between macroeconomic variables and capital flows.
We start with a description of some of the initial conditions that played an important role
in determining the nature and type of capital inflows.  The underlying factors behind private
flows  are  quite  different  from  those  underlying  official  flows.  In  case  of  private  flows,
creditworthiness-as  a result of structural reforms and strong macroeconomic fundamentals-
and economic and financial opportunities-such  as high interest rate differentials-tend  to drive
6  Defmed as the sum of foreign  direct investment,  portfolio  flows, commercial  debt flows, and short-term
flows.
5flows.  In  case of  official  flows, political  considerations  (including  geo-political  or  social
stability), commitment  to  reforms  (usually reflected  in  the conditionality  applied  to  official
financing) and the fiscal deficit tend to be important determinants.  We therefore discuss private
and official flows separately.
Private flows.
Private capital flows depend on domestic factors and international factors, such as foreign
interest rates or demand conditions abroad (see Calvo et al. 1993).  In turn, domestic factors can
be  broadly  classified  into:  structural  reforms  (e.g.,  openness,  privatization,  financial  sector
deepening, banking  sector stability), creditworthiness and macroeconomic fundamentals (e.g.,
fiscal cdeficit,  debt-to-GDP ratio, ratio of short-term debt or monetary base to foreign reserves),
private  sector behavior (e.g., propensity to  save), economic performance indicators (e.g., GDP
growth) and arbitrage opportunities (e.g., domestic-foreign interest rate differentials adjusted for
expected devaluation).  As we discuss below, different types of private flows are likely to depend
differen1tly  on specific subsets of these explanatory variables.
The importance of creditworthiness is well illustrated by the experiences of Poland and
Hungary.  Poland started the transition period with a large commercial debt stock, the result of
heavy borrowing during the early 1980s in an attempt to maintain domestic consumption and
government expenditures.  As this borrowing occurred under the "umbrella" of the then Soviet
Union, Poland's  individual creditworthiness mattered less.  The subsequent political  transition
and loss of the umbrella implied, however, a rapid loss of creditworthiness in the late  1980s.
Poland  subsequently had to go through first a Paris and then a Brady plan debt reduction and
debt relief program to bring its debt back to sustainable levels.  It took until October 1994 before
the Brady debt reduction plan was completed and only afterwards did private capital flows take
off.
Bulgaria  also  had  to  go through  a  debt reduction  and  rescheduling  operation  after  it
incurred large amounts of hard currency debt in the late 1980s when aid from the Soviet Union
was sharply reduced.  Following Bulgaria's  Brady debt agreement, private capital flows became
positive,  for the first time since the onset of transition, and particularly after the country adopted a
currency board in mid-1997.  It appears that the currency board provided an implicit exchange
rate  insurance  which,  combined  with  a  high  interest  rate  differential  and  increased
creditworthiness (through both debt reduction and lengthening of the maturities of external debt),
attracted private capital flows.
In the case of Hungary, the initial debt stock was also high, but Hungary did not resort to
debt  rescheduling  or  reduction.  This  signaled  Hungary's  commitment  to  servicing  its
international obligations  in full and on time; that, in turn,  may have bolstered other kind  of
private inflows.  Until  1995, Hungary was the largest recipient of private capital flows in the
region.  However, Hungary relied mostly on FDI and portfolio flows for its financing needs as
commercial lenders were reluctant to extend large amounts of new financing (in part this was
also due to problems with the provision of accurate balance-of-payment information during the
1980s).
6Initially, Russia was in a somewhat better position than most countries as its outstanding
debt obligations were relatively low.  But large borrowings during the late  1980s, much of it
from  official sources, led to  subsequent debt servicing problems, which  were partly  resolved
through repeated reschedulings.  Nevertheless, debt stocks and debt service remained and remain
high relative to exports and GDP (it should be noted, however, that Russia has ran consistently
large trade surpluses).  In case of Russia, what led to large private inflows was probably not so
much (the perception of) improved creditworthiness, but rather the very high interest rates on
government bonds.  In 1996, Russia received $7.3 billion in ]portfolio  flows, most of it to finance
the government deficit.
For the rest of the FSU, inherited debt stocks were zero as they all reached agreement in
the early 1990s for Russia to assume all debts and assets of the FSU (as the states of the FSU had
each signed a joint  and several liability agreement for the external debt, assumption of claims
was necessary and the only practical solution).  This "zero-debt" initial condition was a factor
why early reformers-like  most  of the Baltics-were  able to attract substantial  private  flows
from the outset, almost $3 billion over the 1992-96 period.
Non-debt  creating private flows to the region, inclucling FDI, were low until  1990 (less
than half a billion dollars annually) with, as noted, most of it to  Hungary.  The transition to
market economies created opportunities for foreigners to engage in long-term risk investments in
the region.  But even though FDI grew, from $2.2 billion  in  1991 to  $6.4 billion in  1994, it
remained small relative to other regions.  In 1994, for example, it was less than FDI to Mexico in
that year.  As reform in these countries further progressed, FDI rose significantly, reaching $16.1
billion in 1995-although  this figure is somehow distorted by record high privatization-related
FDI  in  Hungary ($4.5  billion  in  1995).7 This  reflected in part  a  general  increase in  FDI  to
developing countries. But, there also appears to have been a threshold effect, which once reform
passed a certain level, a take-off of private capital flows in general occurred (Figure 5).
Domestic reforms aimed at liberalizing prices, trade and private  sector activities have
been very important for motivating the inflow of private capital.  Countries did pursue many
policies to  attract capital  flows, in particular they  quite rapidly  liberalized their  current  and
capital accounts.  In addition, some provided official guarantees for flows to private borrowers,
while others provided special tariff or tax regimes to attract FDI flows.  However, compared to
the impact of general reform, specific policies appear to have played a limited role in explaining
capital flows.
Some countries experienced large private capital inflows to private companies and state
enterprises  early  on,  even  prior  to  the  transition,  but  this  most  often  reflected  special
circumstances.  Several countries are well endowed with natural resources and were as a result
able to attract FDI in these sectors, even when overall markel.  reforms were still at an early stage.
About half of total net inflows for Azerbijan and Kazakstan in 1995 and 1996, for example, were
7  FDI averaged $14.7 billion in 1996-97.
7in  the form  of  FDI,  even though  they  score low  on policy reform.  In  other countries,  the
privatization strategy pursued greatly influenced capital flows (Figure 6).  For example, since the
onset of transition, Estonia, and Hungary even earlier, pursued a policy of actively selling firms
on  a case-by-case basis to  strategic investors, including foreign investors.  As  a result, FDI-
inflows dominate private inflows for both countries (FDI-inflows to Hungary actually exceeded
in  1996 total  net  flows).  And in  case of  Russia in recent  years,  FDI-flows have  increased
significantly as a result of the privatization of a few, large resource-based state enterprises.
Capital  flows  have  also  been  influenced  by  the  behavior  of  domestic  savings.
Theo:retically, foreign savings can be a complement or a substitute to private domestic savings.
The type of relationship between capital flows and domestic savings can have a bearing on the
sustainability of capital flows.  Hernandez and Rudolph (1995) found for economies  in other
regions that capital flows tend to be more sustainable when foreign and domestic savings are
complementary.  Figure 7 suggest a complementarity between aggregate domestic  saving and
total  private  flows.  Based  on  this  complementarity  alone,  capital  flows  are  likely  to  be
sustainable.
A few countries have had (temporary) situations of "overheating" associated with large
privale capital inflows (excluding FDI).  For example, private debt flows were large in the Czech
Republic  and  Slovakia during  1995; and  portfolio flows.were  large in  Poland  and  Hungary
during  1995, in Russia during  1996 and  in Poland  during  1997. For the region  as a  whole,
however, short-term private flows (excluding FDI) were insignificant before 1993 and were less
than one-third of all flows thereafter.  More importantly, with a few exceptions, the share of
capital flows relative to GDP remained small.  Relative to GDP, only the Czech Republic and
Hungary received in  1995 large amounts of private capital flows, 10.9 percent and 8.2 percent
respectively.  So did some of the smaller Former Soviet Union countries in some specific years,
but this mainly reflected the lumpy nature of private capital flows (e.g., FDI in a gold-mine in the
Kyrgyz republic in  1995/96) or, in the case of some Baltics, heavy intermediation of foreign
finds  by local banks.  Even these relatively high levels of capital inflows were well below the
sustained high  levels of  capital inflows seen  in recent years  for some  East Asian and  Latin
American countries, for those countries had several years of current account deficits up to 8-9
percent  which  were  largely  privately  financed  and,  unlike  in  transition  economies,  often
associated with strong declines in domestic saving (see Alba et al, 1998).
Though not for the region as a whole, there are several cases where financial arbitrage
likely played a major role in motivating capital flows.  For example, in recent years, there have
been substantial foreign investment in portfolio flows in the form of purchases of local currency
fixed-income instruments, such as Russian, Polish, Hungarian and Czech T-bills and  T-bonds.
Table 3 suggests a positive link between high interest rate differentials (domestic interest rates
corrected for  the ex-post  exchange rate  devaluation minus  US$  LIBOR)  and private  capital
inflows in these countries.  For some countries, bond inflows have coincided with large and rapid
equity portfolio  inflows, much of it through ADRs/GDRs  and  country funds.  In the  Czech
Republic, for example, there have been large equity inflows in  1995 when the equity market
8increased  by 150 percent.!  Similarly,  Estonian banks have relied heavily on foreign issues of
Eurobonds to lower their funding costs during 1996-97. As demand for paper of emerging
economies  in CEE  grew, domestic  interest  rates declined. The  eruption of financial  turbulence  in
Asia led to  substantial outflows and a steep rise in  spreads of  Eurobonds issued by these
countries over comparable US-Treasuries  (as well as declines in  stock markets). This was
especially  the case  for Russia,  Estonia,  Poland and Czech Republic,  but affected  more or less all
countries  in the region. Since  then, spreads  have declined  1o  close to pre-Asian  crisis  levels.
Figures 8 a-b show that there has been a positive association  between domestic credit
growth and private capital inflows for only a few countries. The association  for these countries
stems  both from general  equilibrium  effects  and from banks directly  intermediating  capital  flows.
The large credit growth often seen in other developing countries, has thus been much less
observed  for these countries. This  -may  be due to the early phase of the expansionary  cycle for
most countries or the poor state of institutional  developnnent  of the banking systems in these
countries,  where foreign lenders  are reluctant  to lend large amounts  to still weak banks. Direct
intermediation  of foreign savings  through  domestic  banks has, for most countries,  been limited.
An exception  has been Estonia,  where  in 1997  the banking  sector  relied  heavily on foreign  issues
of Eurobonds  to fmance their domestic lending. Because of the general equilibrium  effects of
capital inflows, however,  there were a few other countries  where high credit growth and large
capital  inflows coincided  (e.g.,  Czech  Republic).
Finally, while from a policy  maker point of view, policy variables  are what matter most,
there is evidence that capital inflows have been often associated with improvements  in key
macroeconomic  performance  indicators  such as GDP growth. As Figure 9 a-b illustrate,  private
capital flows  exhibit a  positive relationship with  GD1P  growth.  This  highly observable
performance  indicator  may serve  as a proxy,  to private  investors,  for effective  reforms.
Officialflows
In the early stages of reform  in the countries,  a major share  of official  assistance  took the
form of balance of payments and budgetary support, including official debt relief.  This was
necessary  as the transition meant a substantial  drop in fiscal revenues,  especially  for the FSU-
countries  where government  revenues essentially  collapsed. Receipts from the state enterprise
sector fell sharply, partly as a result of privatization,  partly as a result of the elimination (or
reductions)  of price subsidies,  and partly as a result of a breakdown of the tax system. Price
liberalization  brought into the open the extensive systems of cross-subsidies  inherent in the
planned economy, shifting all  or  most of the  cost onto the  budget.  Also, the  new tax
administrations  proved unable to tax the emerging sectors.  At the same time, there were
pressures  to maintain  expenditures,  especially  for social  purposes.
8  Foreign  purchases  of equity  securities  increased  from  $497 million  in 1994  to $1,236  million  in 1995.
9Fiscal deficits were large in many transition economies during 1990-96, averaging 6 to 7
percent of GDP in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Uzbekistan.  They were even higher in Russia-an
average of 8.5 percent of GDP over 1992-96 and continued to be high  in  1997.  In addition,
governments often mandated the banking system to undertake quasi-fiscal activities-most  often
extending (subsidized) credits to state enterprises (Claessens and Peters, 1997, analyze the case
of Bui]garia; Claessens and Abdelati,  1995, the case of Romania).  Among slower reformers,
credit subsidies from the central bank were on the order of three times the  size of the fiscal
deficit (De Melo and Denizer,  1997).  Much of these fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficits ended up
being funded through seignorage and inflation tax.  Seignorage averaged more than 16 percent of
GDP in Russia during  1992-93, about the same as total central government revenues (Easterly
and Viera da Cunha, 1994).  In CEE, it was more modest, averaging 5 to 6 percent of GDP in
Polancd  and Hungary during  1990-92.  As Figure  10 shows, official flows tend to have a close
relationship with the fiscal deficits; the two variables indeed have one of the closest correlation
relationship  for  all  types  of  capital  flows  and  various  possible  explanatory  variables  (a
correlation coefficient of -0.69, where a fiscal deficit is defined negative).
Official support (from international financial institutions and individual country donors)
provided partial financing for these fiscal deficits, thus reducing inflationary pressures. Official
suppolt, however, was also conditioned on reform efforts and has typically been larger, relative
to population or GDP, for those countries that subsequently advanced further with reforms.  For
example, the  Visegrad countries,  the most  advanced reformers (along with the  Baltics),  had
received by the end of  1993 more than half of all the disbursements of international financial
instituitions to  the region.  Total  official disbursements to  the CEECs,  which have  generally
progressed furthest in their reforms, accounted for an average of about 2.7 percent of their GDP
in 1991-93, actually comparable to the Marshall plan (aid under the Marshall Plan after World
War II averaged 2.5 percent of the incomes of recipient countries during the period it was being
disbursed).  External  official  finance  has  thus  helped  underpin  a  number  of  reform  and
stabilization programs, in creating confidence (as was true of the Polish stabilization fund), and
in reducing the need for monetary financing to cover budget deficits. Bilateral and multilateral
(mainly the EU) assistance has also had a large component of technical assistance.
But for sustained reformers the period of official flows was short: the Czech Republic, for
example, drew on IMF credits and other official loans relatively heavily in 1991 and  1992, but
started to repay the IMF earlier than planned-as  did Poland and Hungary in 1995.  Similarly,
Estonia maintains an IMF program but does not draw from it. This may explain why there is a
negative correlation between the reform index and official flows for the whole period.  A simple
regression of a reform index on lagged official flows - see section 5 - indeed suggests that official
flows have exerted a positive impact on subsequent reforms. The results of section 5 also suggest
that countries which reformed significantly over the period managed to  attract higher private
flows and may, thus, have experienced a lesser need for lower official flows.
In 1994, official lending shifted to the FSU, which had previously obtained little official
financing, as reforms advanced there.  But reform strengths did differ considerably among FSU-
countries,  and  so  did  official  flows.  Among  the  FSU,  the  Baltic-states,  which  had  made
substanitial  reforms, received more official assistance in relation to the size of their population as
10well as to GDP than, for example, did Belarus. Even today',  many transition economies  in the
FSU still depend heavily on external  capital flows for the financing  for their fiscal deficits,  with
much of this financing from official sources. This is especially the case in Central Asia and
some of the Caucasus  countries,  where official  flows  have been more than 5 percent of GDP for
several countries. Relatively few countries have been successful  in  attracting private capital
flows to finance their fiscal deficits. Most notable among t]hese  countries  was Hungary  earlier
and, in the last two years, Russia which received some private inflows, mostly in the form of
Euro-bonds,  for fiscal deficit financing.
In summary,  official flows have been fiscally driven (for a review of the special fiscal
issues experienced  by transition  economies  see Buiter, 1996). In conjunction,  a commitment  to
subsequent  reform appears  to have been an important  determinant  of official flows. The access
to  capital markets that reforms have facilitated (at least in the most advanced reformers),
however,  has meant  that official  financing  was quickly substituted  by private capital  flows (even
though successful  reformers  usually  still rely on official  flows  as contingent  support).
4.  Dealing  with capital  flows:  the policy framework
As noted, countries  improved  the framework  for capital flows largely through sustained
structural reform efforts, involving liberalization,  privatization,  decentralization,  stabilization,
and institutional  changes.  Capital  inflows  have in general  rewarded  successful  reforms and good
policies by helping to finance investment  needs and, in the case of FDI, by helping to improve
productivity and access to foreign markets-thus  helping to  foster the further integration of
transition  economies  into the global  economy. However,  whi]le  the benefits  are clear,  the Mexico
and Asia crises suggest that rapid surges of - particularly  short-term  - capital flows over a short
time-span  can also pose difficulties  to macroeconomic  and financial  sector  management.
In CEE and FSU, only a few countries-and  only recently-needed  to deal with the
potentially adverse effects of large capital inflows.  There has consequently,  in general, been
little need for the responses traditionally  employed when countries have faced large capital
inflows (i.e., sterilization,  exchange rate management,  capital controls, prudential measures,
capital outflow liberalization,  and fiscal restraint; see further Corbo and Hernandez,  1996). To
illustrate  policy responses  to recent surges  of capital  inflows,  we focus on the experiences  of the
Czech  Republic,  Poland,  Estonia,  Hungary,  and Russia.
Czech Republic9
Following  the initial transition years, when capital inflows were largely dominated by
official sources, private capital flows became important. After averaging around $2.5 billion
annually in 1993-94  (over 80% of which was private finance), capital inflows rose in 1995 to
$7.7 billion, before declining  to about $4 billion in 1996. These large private capital inflows
were strongly  driven by Czech reforms-including the restructuring  needs that followed large-
9  Based in part on Klacek, 1997.
11scale privatization, the gradual liberalization of its current and capital accounts starting in  1991,
its overall fiscal conservative policy (with on average a fiscal deficit close to zero in 1993-96),
and a relatively stable foreign exchange rate combined with a high differential between Czech
and :foreign interest rates.  Expectations of exchange rate appreciation were also  an important
factor, particularly in motivating portfolio inflows.  Strong debt flows occurred in  1995-96, as
bank and enterprises borrowed abroad heavily, reflecting the high interest differentials.  FDI also
trebled between 1994 and 1995, to about $2.5 billion, explained largely by the sale of 27% of the
equity of the Czech telephone company to  a Dutch-led consortium (collecting a record $1.45
billion in one single transaction).
As  the  exchange  rate  was  fixed  with  respect  to  the  Deutsche  Mark  (DM),  Czech
Republic's  largest trading partner, and inflation remained at around 10%, the real exchange rate
appreciated sharply over the  1994-96 period.  Increases in  inflation from wage  pressures and
slow productivity growth led to large increases in relative unit labor costs. A current account
surplus in 1993 (equivalent to 2% of GDP) turned into a large deficit in 1997 (equivalent to 7%
of GDP) and a significant export slowdown followed in 1996 and 1997.  Since 1996, net capital
inflows have declined sharply  and the scarcity of foreign financing has been reflected  in  an
increasing interest rate spread between PRIBOR (Prague Inter-bank Offering Rate) and LIBOR;
the spread rose from around 5% in March 1995 to almost 9% in early 1997.
The  Czech  Republic  was initially  reluctant to  interfere with  the  large  capital  flows,
consilstent with its laissez-faire approach to economic management. However, as capital flows
grew  in  1995, the Czech  government started with  large sterilized  intervention through  open
market operations,  higher reserve requirements on demand and  time deposits,  and  depositing
privatization receipts with the central bank. This resulted in a further real appreciation and rise in
interest rates.  While the adverse monetary impact of reserve growth was partially avoided, high
capital inflows continued, motivated increasingly by higher interest rates. The movements in the
interest spread followed the capital flow-cycle-during  the first phase, "exogenous" capital flows
driven by sustained reforms lowered the interest differential but as the current account moved
into  deficit  and  the  pace  of  reforms  slowed  down, higher  interest  rates  were  necessary  to
maintain the "flow of capital".
In March  1996, the government tried to deter speculative capital flows by widening the
exchange rate band from 1.5% to 150/%-that is, +/- 7.5% around the central parity.  The measure
had ithe desired effect of slowing down and in fact reversing short-term capital inflows.  The
government did not, however, tighten its fiscal stance or introduce capital controls.  Following a
banking sector crisis in early 1997 (in which several larger banks were liquidated), and following
the  growing  perception  that  enterprise  and  bank  restructuring has  been  advanced  less  than
initiadly thought, there was a speculative run against the Czech Koruna.  This  led to  a sharp
downward correction in stock market prices and sizable exchange rate devaluation, followed by
significant capital outflows in mid-1997.  The government was subsequently forced to tighten
fiscal policy and strengthen regulation and supervision of its banking system and capital markets.
12Poland]0
Official  inflows  played  an  important  role  duringj the  first  years  of  the  transition,
particularly  in  financing government deficits.  Over the whole  1990-96 period, however,  net
flows of long-term official credits were close to zero as Poland repaid significant sums. Private
capital flows to Poland initially lagged behind those to Czech Republic and Hungary; however, a
sizable increase occurred following its commercial debt ancl debt service reduction agreement in
October 1994.  The bulk of private capital inflows to Poland after 1994 took the form of FDI-
FDI rose from about $1.8 billion annually in  1993-94, to $6.6 billion in  1997.  Poland became
the largest recipient of FDI of the region on a cumulative basis over  1992-96.  FDI inflows to
Poland were driven by Poland's  structural reforms, the de-facto zloty convertibility since 1991
(initially  for  current  account  transactions  and  later  for  most  capital  account  transactions),
moderate fiscal deficits, overall good macroeconomic performance (highest cumulative growth
of the region over 1992-97) and favorable prospects for EJU-membership.  Privatization of state
enterprises can explain about 20% of FDI  inflows-far  less than in Hungary.  Most valuable
Polish companies have not been privatized yet (copper, telecommunications, energy, insurance
and several of the large banks). Portfolio inflows became significant in 1995, with purchases of
Treasury bills  by  foreigners reaching  $1 billion  that  year-encouraged  by  high  yields  and
expectations of significant nominal zloty appreciation-and  in 1997. In 1996-97, several banks
and companies issued medium-term paper in the Eurobond market and benefited from low and
declining spreads, reaching under 100 basis points over equivalent US Treasuries in 1997.
Capital inflows  and  a  current  account  surplus  in  1995 were  associated  with  strong
monetary  and credit  expansion and with  slow disinflation.  A 20 percent  real exchange  rate
appreciation  in  1995-96 was  followed  by  a  deterioration  of  the  current  account  balance
equivalent to almost 8 percentage points of GDP over 1996-97. The government responded to the
above concerns with a more flexible exchange rate regime, sterilized interventions and tightening
of monetary and fiscal policy. Instead, Poland virtually did not rely on explicit capital controls to
manage adverse capital flows. A permission  from the central bank for foreign credits and loans with
repayment  period of less than 12 months (for services  other  than commodity  circulation  and individual's
services)  appears  to have no significant  effect on the structure  of flows - similar requirements  for longer-
tem loans and credits  were lifted as a result of OECD  membership  negotiations.
The biggest concern in the second half of 1994 and 1995 was the impact on inflation of
fast foreign reserve growth.  The largest source of foreign. reserve accumulation in  1994 and
1995 was "net unclassified transactions" of the current account-$9.6  billion between 1995 and
the  first quarter of  1996.  These refer mostly to  flows on  account of cross-border trade  and
tourism, motivated by high price differentials between Poland and Germany, on one hand, and
Poland and countries east on the other.  Other substantial (albeit smaller) sources of reserve
growth were  portfolio  and  FDI  inflows. The  government responded  with  a  combination  of
sterilized interventions and a more flexible exchange rate policy regime.  Open market operations
trebled between the first half of 1994 and the second half of I:995. The widely-spread perception
that the exchange rate was undervalued led to the creation of a wide exchange rate band of +/- 7
10  Based  in part on Duljasz  and Kokoszczynski,  1997.
13perceint  around the central parity in May 1995. The exchange rate quickly appreciated to the top
of the band  and  by  the year-end the band  itself was appreciated.  Following a  slowdown  in
foreign exchange reserve accumulation since the second quarter of 1996-also  facilitated by the
liberalization  of purchases  of foreign assets  such as real  estate  and portfolio investments  by
residents  (an  OECD  membership  requirement)-the  central  bank  was  able  to  reduce  its
sterilization activities and maintain the exchange rate policy adopted during  1995.  The above
policies were also supported by a deliberate commitment to lower interest rates as a means to
discourage portfolio flows driven by high interest rate differentials. The period did see, though, a
rapid  surge  in  domestic  credit  associated  with  a  hike in  domestic  aggregate demand  and  a
turnaround of the current account from a 4.6 percent of GDP surplus in 1995 to a deficit of  1
perceint  of GDP in 1996.
The biggest concern in 1997 was the further deterioration of the external current account.
Moneitary policy was sharply tightened starting early  1997, with real interest rates in Treasury
Bills end Bonds rising from around zero percent in previous years to about 10 percent during the
year.  To enhance the effectiveness of the monetary policy transmission mechanism, the central
bank accepted deposits directly from the public-thus  inducing some large state-owned banks to
raise their deposit rates.  With high domestic interest rates, there was a new surge of portfolio
flows.  To reduce these inflows, the Government responded by eliminating altogether intra-band
exchange  rate  interventions-thus  effectively raising  the exchange  rate  uncertainty  faced by
short-term speculative capital flows, renewed sterilization activity, and a tighter than anticipated
fiscal policy.  By October, there was a deceleration of credit growth-and  the current account
balance ended the year with a  3.2% of GDP deficit, substantially less than what  was earlier
anticipated.
Estonia
Capital  inflows  to  Estonia  were  dominated  by  domestic  factors,  including  the
introduction domestic currency linked through a currency board  system to the Deutsche Mark
(DM), attractive interest rate differentials, structural reforms (especially trade and banking sector
reform), and an active privatization program.  Capital inflows (beginning in 1993) preceded the
economic recovery-following  four years of rapid contraction, output growth only resumed in
1995.  Capital inflows were initially dominated by FDI-inflows. Since mid-95, however, there
has been a relative decline of FDI in overall capital flows and a surge in domestic banks'  access
to  international  capital markets.  The counterpart of  the latter was  a  rapid surge  in  private
domestic credit.  Driven by private aggregate demand  (fiscal deficits averaged 0.5 percent  of
GDP during the 1993-96 period), the current account balance declined from a surplus in 1993 to
a deficit of over 10 percent of GDP in 1996 and 13 percent in  1997. Under the currency board
regime, the central bank's monetary interventions have been limited to buying and selling foreign
exchange to preserve the parity with the DM.  Since there has been no intervention through open
market operations, base money growth has been driven by demand for domestic assets. Strong
demand for domestic assets led to high growth of monetary base, broad money (including foreign
exchange deposits) as well as credit between 1992 and 1997.  Estonia did not resort to capital
controls nor to sterilization.
14The fast growth of domestic credit, the declining share of FDI in capital inflows, the high
current account deficit and turmoil in Asia since mid-1997, however, prompted the government
to tighten  banking sector prudential regulations and supervision in  late  1997.  The latter was
aimed at curbing fast credit growth and, only indirectly, at curbing portfolio inflows (since banks
were funding  domestic  credit with  Eurobond  issues).  The creation of a  stabilization fund  -
whereby budget surpluses and public sector deposits were invested in foreign assets abroad - and
a number of other measures aimed at tightening monetary policy and regulations were announced
in early October 1997.  These other measures included the raising of the capital adequacy ratio
from  8% to  10%;  certain curbs  on  local  government's  borrowing;  the  extension  of  reserve
requirements for the banks to  include net borrowing from abroad; and  increases in the daily
liquidity requirement for banks.
The  announcement  of  these  measures,  combined  with  some  indications  from  the
government that it would remove public sector deposits frcm commercial banks to create the
stabilization fund, and previously un-anticipated delays in the funding abroad of several domestic
banks, led to a liquidity crisis in the banking sector on October 20, 1997.  Interest rates jumped
over 300 basis points and between October 20 and the end of November the stock market price
index lost  over  60% of  its value.  To restore confidence, the  central bank  decided to  bring
forward the implementation of the previously announced measures and announced new measures
to tighten banking regulations, including a further increase in capital adequacy requirements to
120/%-to be implemented at a later (unspecified) stage, and increases in the liquidity ratios of
banks. The firm stance of banking regulators and the tightening of fiscal policy were conducive
to a significant slowdown of credit growth and to improved liquidity in financial markets.
HungarylI
As  reward  for  its  early  reform efforts  and  continuous  servicing  of  its  foreign  debt,
Hungary received large capital inflows (including FDI) from the early 1990s on.  Lack of fiscal
discipline in 1993-94, however, led to a large surge in its current account deficit, reaching almost
10% of GDP in  1994), and created an unsustainable situation. The foreign exchange crisis in
1994 led to an economic downturn, and large debt financing to the public sector was necessary.
Following fiscal adjustment and  a devaluation in  early  1995, there was a new  surge  in FDI
closely linked to an ambitious privatization program (including the privatization of banks and
some utilities). A sharp fiscal adjustment along with an intensification of structural reforms led to
a rapid contraction in the current account deficit. Capital inflows declined as the path of fast
privatization could not be sustained after 1995.
Sterilized  intervention  was  extensively pursued  during  the  periods  in  which  capital
inflows threatened the monetary program.  To a lesser extent:,  capital account liberalization also
helped as it led to capital outflows.  Exchange rate flexibility, i.e. a devaluation, was used when
capital  outflow  pressures  dominated  (1994-95).  The  sharp  fiscal  adjustment  and  monetary
tightening  helped  to  keep  the  current  account  deficit  subsequently under  control.  Strong
-11  Based in part on Oblath, 1997.
15productivity growth (supported by structural reforms)-unit  labor costs declined sharply-has
been.  another key factor keeping the current account to manageable proportions.
Russia
Capital  flows  to  and  from  Russia  were  characterized by  large  official  inflows-on
average  $3.5  billion  in  1993-96,  very  large  capital  outflows  ("capital  flight")-errors  and
omissions in the Balance of Payments averaged $8 billion in 1995-96-and,  since 1996, a surge
in portfolio in flows, mostly in the form of purchases of Treasury Bills (GKO).  The surge in
both official and portfolio flows was closely linked with the large financing requirements of the
budget-8.1%  of GDP on average in 1993-97-and,  since 1996, with the government's strategy
to  increase  the  share  of foreign  financing  of fiscal  deficits  as  a  way  of  reducing  domestic
financial and inflationary pressures.  While  conditionality attached to  official flows has  been
supportive  of  ongoing  reform  efforts  in  the  country,  legal  uncertainties,  weak  institutions,
criminality and limited opportunities for foreigners to participate in privatizations may explain
why foreign direct investment has been relatively (to GDP) low-FDI  averaged $600 million in
1993-94 and $1.9 billion in  1995-96.  However, further increases are anticipated over coming
years as a result of reforms conducive to improve the business environment for foreign investors
(faster privatization, improvements to the collateral system, land and tax reform, changes to the
bankruptcy law, improved transparency in the accounts of state enterprises, national treatment for
foreign investors).
The scale of capital outflows (to the extent that they result from tax avoidance or evasion)
in part explains the difficulties that the government faces in reducing its deficit.  Capital outflows
may also help to explain why the sharp tightening of monetary policy in 1996 induced a strong
rise in portfolio inflows (as Russians reinvested their money back into the country). Inflation has
fallen substantially from 131% in 1995 to 21.8% in 1996 and 11% in 1997. Interest rate declines
lagged behind, however, with the average Treasury Bill rate falling from 176% in 1995 to 102%
in 1996 and 33% in  1997.  The resulting high real interest rates, combined with the sharp real
appreciation of  the currency in  1995 and  1996, have been key  motives  behind the  surge  in
portfolio flows targeting fixed income instruments.  Portfolio investors, mostly over 200 foreign
investment funds, primarily purchased Treasury Bills, with purchases in April  1997 peaking at
$2 billion.  As real interest rates declined in  1997, investors have been increasingly targeting
traded shares of Russian enterprises-in  early 1997, they owned about one-third of such shares
or about $3 billion.  Unlike other large capital-importing countries in the region, Russia did not
pursue deliberate policies to slow down capital inflows.  However, the exchange rate flexibility
conferred by its wide exchange rate band has presumably been some deterrent against short-term
portfolio flows.
5.  Econometric tests and evaluation
The above sections suggest that the reasons for the capital flows are largely the pursuit of
economic reform.  They also made clear that the factors influencing capital flows have differed
by thie types of capital flow. Furthermore, policy responses (for example, degree of sterilization,
liberalization or  imposition of capital controls) have also differed by the  degree and type of
16capital flows.  To make these relationships more precise and to study the separate effects of some
of these factors we provide some regression results in this section.
The main aim of the regressions is to try to explain the magnitude of the various types of
capital  flows  for  individual  countries.  Common  with  the  existing  literature  (e.g.,  Calvo,
Leiderman and Reinhart, 1993, Cuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi, 1998; Hernandez and Rudolph,
1995, and  Taylor  and  Sarnio,  1997; Montiel  and Reinhart,  1997, provides  a  review  of this
literature),  we  distinguish two  groups of  explanatory vaiiables:  international  factors  ("push-
factors"); and domestic factors ("pull factors).  Push-factors are thought of conditions in global
capital markets that influence the supply of capital and aie outside the control of a particular
recipient  country.  Pull-factors  are  thought  of  as  country-specific  factors  and  conditions
influencing the interest of foreign capital of investing in that particular country.  Some of these
factors are under the control of the country; some are initial conditions; and others are outcomes,
which are in part influenced by capital flows themselves.
For the group of pull-factors, we use the US-dollar, 6-month LIBOR interest rate, and the
economic growth in OECD-countries.  We expect that declines in wol1d interest rates will have a
positive effect on capital flows to CEE/FSU as that will make the rate of return on investing in
these countries higher relative to other alternatives.  The effect of an increase in OECD growth
rate is less obvious.  On one hand, it will likely be associated with a rise in the rate of return on
investment  in  OECD-countries,  thus  reducing  the  attractiveness  of  investing  in  transition
economies.  On the  other hand,  higher growth  may raise the  supply  of  savings  in  OECD-
countries, thus stimulating capital flows.
The  group  of  pull-factors  is  split  into  policy  factors,  i.e.,  "reform  efforts,"  initial
conditions, and "outcomes."  Obviously, it is difficult to quantify the degree of policy reform a
country has been undertaken in absolute terms.  The very similar starting position of most of the
transition  economies-controlled  prices,  little  private  sector  activity,  limited  institutional
development, etc.-makes  it somewhat easier to quantify at least the relative degree of policy
reform in CEE/FSU.  We use the liberalization index from Ele Melo et al, 1997, to rank countries
in their relative reform efforts.  This index, an indicator between 0 and  1, is available for each
country and for each year and aims to measure how far the country has progressed in liberalizing
prices, trade  and private  sector activities, including privatization.  The initial conditions  and
outcomes variables are more difficult to separate, as capital flows are likely to interact with and
affect current outcomes, which then become initial conditions for subsequent capital flows.  We
use  the  country's  GDP-growth  rates,  inflation,  fiscal  balance,  private  savings,  and,  as  a
creditworthiness  indicator, the change in  the country's  reserves.  We lag the  change  in  the
country's reserves and the two savings variables by one period to avoid possible simultaneity (as
the sum of private, public and foreign savings adds up to the change in reserves).  In addition, we
also use a dummy for the ten CEE-countries likely to become EU-member.12
12  We use the following  ten countries  that have been identified  by the EU as candidates:  Czech Republic,
Poland,  Hungary,  Slovenia,  Estonia,  Romania,  Bulgaria,  Slovak  Republic,  Lithuania  and Latvia. The first five
have recently started negotiations  with the EU; we set the dummy  equal to two for these countries. For the
other  five countries,  the dummy  is set to one,  and zero for all other  countries.
17We focus separately on factors that have likely influenced short-term private capital flows
("arbitrage factors').  In particular, we use the exchange rate adjusted rate of return on holding
domestic assets (i.e., the nominal domestic interest rates' 3 minus the rate of change in the local
currency/dollar  exchange  rate)  minus  the  US  dollar  interest  rate.  We  also  investigate  the
relationship  between different types  of capital flows and domestic credit  growth as for other
developing countries important reinforcing effects have been found between private capital flows
and the rate of domestic credit expansion.  Depending on the quality of financial intermediation,
these reinforcing  effects can lead to  subsequent problems, as has  been found for East Asian
countries (see Alba et al., 1998).
We perform  regressions for  seven different  classifications of capital  flows, focussing
mainl;y on  the  source  of  capital:  total  capital  flows, official  flows,  all  private  flows,  FDI,
commrnercial  debt flows, portfolio flows (bonds and equity) and short-term flows.  We study both
total flows as well as categories within these flows as there might be substitution between the
various flows," 4 both in a narrow sense (for example, portfolio flows and FDI can be substituting
in a particular transaction) as well as in a broader macro-economic sense (e.g., large inflows of
one kind can encourage or deter flows of another kind).
We run our regressions in an unbalanced panel setup using a sample of 21 countries for
the years  1992-1996.  The panel  is unbalanced as we do not  have data  for our independent
variables  for each year for each country and private  capital outflows figures  only  for  a few
countiies.  We also had to eliminate three countries (Azerbijan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan) for
lack of reliable data.  All  our dependent variables, US  dollar capital flows, are scaled by US
dollar GNP based on the Atlas-method of the World Bank-which  uses the moving average of
the exchange rate over three years-to  convert local currency GNP to US dollar GNP.  This way
we smooth out the effect of large real exchange rate movements.
We have the option of estimating the regression model with individual effects or with a
common constant term.  The first, the fixed effects model, assumes that differences across the
countries can be captured in differences in the constant term.  The other option is to use ordinary
least squares and  estimate the regression model  assuming that  the constant term is the  same
across countries.  To determine which type of estimation was most appropriate, we conducted F-
tests for each regression, testing the hypothesis that the constant terms are all equal.  The results
suggested that for total, official, private, FDI and commercial debt flows an estimation using a
commion constant,  in  addition  to  the  EU-accession dummy  variable, will  provide  the  most
consisitent and efficient estimators.  For the remaining type of flows, portfolio flows and short-
term debt flows, the fixed effects model was more appropriate.
13  We used as much as possible the local Treasury  bill rate.  For those countries  where Treasury bill rates
were not available,  we used  the inter-bank  interest  rate or the bank-lending  rate.
14  We would  like  to thank Michael  Dooley  for reminding  us of this.
18We correct for heteroskedasticity in the error terms of the regressions.  In particular, the
size of the country has an effect on the relationships.  We expect that this effect arises for several
reasons.  First, because of fixed costs of acquiring informat:ion,  we expect that small countries
exhibit a less clear relationship between explanatory variables and capital flows, as investors will
expend fewer resources in  analyzing small country characteristics.  Second, the  lumpiness of
some  of the  flows,  particularly  FDI,  but  also  of  official  flows, may  make  for  more  noisy
relationship of flows (when scaled by GDP) for smaller countries.  Thirdly, we expect smaller
countries to be less economically diversified and more affecled by external and internal shocks,
thus  creating  again  more  noisy  relationships.  Fourthily, available  data  are  likely  more
problematic for small countries as their statistical system are less well developed.  Plotting the
error terms  against the  size of the country confirm this type of heteroskedasticity.  For these
reasons we use the estimated cross-section residual variances as weights in the regressions.
In  light  of  the  discussion  from  the  previous  sections,  we  start  with  a  benchmark
regression  for all seven categories of capital flows with the following explanatory variables:
reform index, a dummy for EU-accession (which takes the value of two for those five countries
currently in negotiations, one for the other five countries, and zero for all other countries), and
the change in the level of foreign exchange reserves (with declines in reserves having a positive
sign). As a second step we add single additional explanatory variables, keeping the total number
of variables thus to four.  Results for these seven regressions are presented in Table 4.
We find that the reform and reserves variables are significant explanatory variables of all
categories  of  flows;  the  EU-dummy  is  significant  for  tw7o  of  the  seven  categories.  Not
surprisingly, we find that the effort in undertaking reform in a particular country is positively
associated with all types of flows, except for official and rortfolio  flows.  This  suggests that
reforms were important motivating factors for private capital flows.  Reform effort matters too in
determining official flows, but with  a  negative coefficient.  This  would suggest  that official
financing went to those countries that have reformed less.  The correct interpretation, however,
might be that official financing went to those countries that had reformed less initially, but that
some  conditionality was being applied  in  official financing.  Reform efforts  may then have
increased  following large  official flows and  over time  official  flows to  those  countries  that
reformed more declined.  This overall negative relationship for official flows thus reflects that
official flows preceded reform efforts and fell off as reforms progressed." 5 This result suggests
that a dynamic  model of official capital flows and progress in  liberalization is required. The
negative sign for the reform variable in the case of portfolio flows likely reflects that a significant
part of portfolio flows was directed towards the financing of fiscal deficits, which may have been
larger in countries which reformed less.
For FDI, the dummy for EU-accession is positively  significant.  EU-accession is likely
most important for FDI as the prospects of increased integration with Western Europe has meant
15  A regression of reform on  lagged official flows indeed confimis this relationship: using a  fixed-effect
estimator,  we find that the coefficient  for lagged official  flows is significantly  positive  and has a t-statistic  of
2.74.
19that both opportunities for favorable investments and overall creditworthiness increased in these
countries more than in others.
The negative sign for the lagged change in reserves variable for most flows reflects the
fact  that  increased  creditworthiness  of  countries,  i.e., as  they  increased  reserves,  motivated
further capital flows.  The positive sign for the lagged changes in reserves variable for official
flows reflects that, at least initially, official financing was made available on a financing needs
basiis, i.e.,  as  reserves  declined, more  official  financing  was  made  available.  Similarly  for
portfolio flows, much of which was directed to financing of fiscal deficits, financing needs was
an important determinant.
As  mentioned,  we  added to  this  basic  regression  a  number  of  additional  variables,
including each separately.  Specifically, we included public sector balance, current as well as
lagged one period (to avoid simultaneity between foreign and domestic savings), private savings
(lagged one period), domestic credit growth, lagged official flows, and the interest differential.
We also include the two push variables, LIBOR and OECD growth rates.  Rather than presenting
all the detailed regressions results, we simply present whether or not the particular additional
variable was significant, and if so, with what sign (Table 4).
We find that fiscal surpluses, both  contemporaneous and lagged, are positively  related
wilth about half of  the different types  of flows. This suggests that  increased fiscal  surpluses
stimulate foreign savings through a creditworthiness effect.  The negative coefficients for official
flows show that official flows to the public sector have been associated with larger fiscal deficits
(see also the scatter plot in section 3).  The coefficient is also negative for portfolio flows, likely
as countries with larger fiscal deficits receive more portfolio flows through foreign purchases of
government bonds (particularly Russia). Lagged private savings has a negative coefficient for all
flovvs,  except for commercial debt flows.  This suggests that there is some substitution between
foreign and private savings, a general finding for developing countries (see Cohen, 1993). The
coefficients are small, however, thus concerns about the sustainability of foreign flows, as they
end up financing some share of consumption, may not be too  serious.  The positive sign for
private savings in the commercial debt flows regression may reflect a creditworthiness effect.
Domestic credit growth is significantly negative in case of total private flows, short-term
flows and commercial debt flows.  This suggests that the typical reinforcing  effect of capital
flows on domestic credit growth is not prevalent in these countries.  This may be because of the
poor  institutional development of the domestic  financial sector.  The negative sign  may also
reflect that the enterprise restructuring required in these countries was often achieved through
tight (hard) budget constraints.  Countries with had less growth in domestic credit may have been
more successful with enterprise restructuring and thus were more likely candidates for private
capital flows as their creditworthiness in general increased and as a greater fraction of domestic
firms were restructured and thus of interest to foreign investors.
Lagged official flows have a positive effect on almost all types of capital flows.  Since
the :regression  already controls for the reform effort of the particular country, which thus captures
the degree to which  official lenders may have been successful in their reform conditionality,
20there is an independent effect of past official lending on private capital flows.  This may  be
because official lending acted as important signal to private creditors regarding the commitment
of the country to undertake further reforms.
The interest differential variable is significant for only two of the types of capital flows,
portfolio flows and short-term flows.  Only for portfolio flows does it have the expected positive
sign while for short-term flows the sign is negative.  This suggests that, once one controls for a
few basic variables, capital flows at large have not been motivated by arbitrage conditions.
Push factors appear to play a role in motivating capital flows, but with the opposite sign
from  what  is  commonly  found.  Specifically,  increases  in  international  interest  rates  are
associated with increased capital flows.  And higher OECD-growth rates also increase capital
flows.  This contradictory findings raises  some questions of its own, but at least it does not
suggest that capital flows to these countries are at risk for increases in international interest rates
and OECD growth.  It may rather be that increases in  OElCD-growth enhance the  supply of
foreign savings available for these countries.
Table  5 provides  the regression  results  for the specification  chosen  for each  type  of
capital flow.  The explanatory variables were chosen after some experimentation to  achieve a
reasonable overall fit for the regression, within constraints of data availability.
In the case of total flows, reform efforts, EU-accession and changes in reserves have the
same sign as before.  Additional significant explanatory variables are the lagged fiscal balance
and lagged official capital flows, both with a positive coefficient.
Total private capital flows depend strongly on refonn  efforts. We again find a positive
coefficient for those countries with possible accession to the EU and a negative relationship with
the  lagged change in  foreign exchange reserves  - which suggests that  creditworthiness  is  an
important factor.  Higher  (lagged) fiscal savings tends  to raise private  flows, suggesting  that
creditworthiness and  reform perceptions were  influenced positively  by reduced fiscal deficits.
More  generally,  the  positive  relationship  between  private  capital  flows  and  fiscal  savings
suggests  a  complementarity  between  public  and  foreign  savings.  We  also  find  a  positive
coefficient for lagged official flows, a possible  confirmation of the  signal from past  official
lending on future reforms and creditworthiness.  Private capital flows are negatively related to
domestic credit growth, suggesting that contractions in credit growth may have served as signal
of reform.
In  the case of official  flows, the results  show that  reform efforts  enter  again with  a
negative  (but insignificant) coefficient.  Countries that are candidates to become  a member of
the EU have  received less  official financing,  suggesting that,  as they received  more private
financing and progressed further in reforms, were in less need of official financing.  This need
for financing is again confirmed in the positive coefficient for the reserve variable, indicating that
declines in foreign exchange reserves are associated with moire  official financing.  Lagged fiscal
surpluses have a positive relationship with official flows, suggesting official flows were made
conditional on past  fiscal efforts. However, the high  correlation between  fiscal surpluses and
21reform efforts implies that when the reform variable is removed, the sign of the fiscal surplus
variable becomes negative, i.e., there is collinearity between regressors. The interpretation in this
latter case is more straightforward - lower fiscal surpluses (higher deficits) are associated with
larger official flows. The coefficient for OECD growth rate is significantly positive, suggesting
that  the supply of official savings may have been a positive function of the business cycle in
industrial countries.
FDI, as we showed above, is the most important private capital flows for most countries.
In this specification, FDI is dependent as before on the three major independent variables: reform
efforts, EU-accession and reserve changes. Not surprisingly, as for all private capital flows, FDI
is greatly influenced by reform efforts, as the t-statistic for the reform index is large.  Lankes and
Stern (1997), and Martin and Selowsky (1997) had already noted this. Lagged official flows are
positively significant, suggesting again a signaling function of official flows.
Portfolio flows appear to be driven by a number of factors, some of which are collinear,
thus leading to mostly insignificant coefficients when many variables are included.  The best
regression  result  is then  also  not  very  informative. Fiscal  balance (lagged  one period)  now
appears to  increase portfolio flows, a  finding different from the earlier regression where  the
opposite  coefficient  was  found.  Interestingly,  the  interest  rates  differential  variable  is  not
significant.  As noted, not all of these relationships are robust to inclusion of other independent
variables, in part likely  due to  the collinearity of the independent variables, but  also because
portfolio flows are relatively small and have occurred only in more recent years, thus leading to
weaker relationships.
Lastly, we regressed the flow of short-term debt flows and commercial debt flows. As
notecd,  short-term debt has become a large share of private capital flows in  recent years  for a
number of countries.  Private debt flows and short-term debt flows appear to be driven by the
same factors, except for reform efforts.  The degree of reform matters in  a positive way  for
comrnercial debt flows and negatively for short-term debt flows.  The negative sign for short-
term flows, which differs from the results in Tables 4, could reflect that lenders were less willing
to extend long-term funds, and relatively more willing to extend short-term funds, to countries
which had  undertaken less reform.  Increases in reserves lead to  larger commercial debt and
short-term flows (the latter is insignificant, however).  This suggests that creditworthiness also
matters for these flows.  Private debt flows appear to be substitutes to domestic private savings as
the coefficients are negative.  Lastly, OECD growth rates matter for short-term flows. We find no
evidence of a push effect, as the coefficient for the LIBOR interest rates is insignificant; in other
words, the decline in international interest rates has not stimulated commercial debt or short-term
flows.  Arbitrage factors, i.e., the interest differential, do not appear to have a significant effect
on short-term flows, which is somewhat surprising.
In  short,  the  overall  results  indicate  that  flows  are  driven  for  most  countries  by
fundamental  reforms  and  creditworthiness.  The  possibility  of  EU-accession  has  been  an
important determinant of private flows, especially FDI.  For official flows, EU-accession seems
to have lowered the need for official flows.  Increased fiscal savings has led to higher volumes
for most flows, while increased private savings have been associated with lower capital flows -
22suggesting some degree of substitutability between private and foreign savings.  Official flows
appear to have had important signaling value for private capital flows.  For no flows did high
interest rates differentials (adjusted for exchange rate movements) appear to have mattered.  Push
effects are only found for commercial debt and short-term debt flows, with growth in OECD-
countries encouraging flows to the region.
6.  Conclusions and Forward-Looking Issues
Capital flows to CEE/FSU have been increasing rapidly in recent years-a  growth rate of
34% per annum over the 1991-1997 period, but are still a smal].  fraction of global capital flows to
developing  countries  (about  18%  in  1997).  As  structural  reforms  have  progressed,  the
composition  of  flows  has  changed  with  official flows  declining  and  private  capital  flows
increasing and accounting for about 73% of total flows by  1997.  Within private capital flows,
FDI was the most important followed by portfolio flows. As the direct and spillover effects of
FDI on  human, technological and  physical capital  accumulation are crucial for  the fast  and
effective integration of the transition economies to the world economy, this bodes well for these
countries.
Perhaps  more than  in  other developing countries, reiform efforts have  been the  most
important determinant of private flows, particularly, of FDI. Other consistent determinants of
private  flows have been prospective  EU membership-the  1]0 countries that  applied  for EU
membership  attracted  more  private  flows  (and  relied  less  on  official  flows)-and
creditworthiness-creditworthiness  proxies  such as increases in reserves, lower  fiscal deficits,
greater past official flows were mostly positively correlated with greater private  flows.  The
association between declines in private savings and higher private debt flows, however, causes
some concerns.
One key policy implication is that the sustainability of capital flows is associated with the
sustainability  of  reform  efforts.  The  consistency  and  corttinuity  of  structural  reforms-
particularly  those  that  are conducive to  EU integration  and  improved  creditworthiness-can
influence the source (official versus private) as well  as the  type of private  capital flow  (for
example, the reform's  impact on FDI-flows is positive while the impact on short-term debt flows
is negative).  This, in turn, implies that reform efforts matter not just  for the level  of capital
flows, but also for the maturity and potential volatility of flows.
The shift from debt-creating flows to the public sector in the 1980's to non-debt creating
flows to the private sector in the 1990s has also implications for the efficiency of resource and
risk allocation. For one, private recipients of capital have better incentives to allocate capital into
higher return projects. The shift to non-debt creating flows, in turn, implies a better risk-sharing
arrangement (of fixed-term foreign currency obligations) vis-a-vis foreign investors.
Another feature of capital flows to the region has been the increase in the share of short-
term debt and portfolio flows since 1993.  The concentration of these, potentially more volatile
short-term flows in  1993-96 in a few countries, raises questions about sustainability of capital
flows and vulnerability to international shocks in these economies.  For the majority of countries
23in the region, however,  the absolute and relative level of short-term  foreign  obligations  is small
compared  to the size of their economies  as well as compared  to the high levels of their foreign
exchange  reserves.
So far, only a few countries  have had to deal with episodes of overheating. Looking
forward,  it is likely that more countries  will have to deal with the constraints  that the level and
structure of  external liabilities may  pose  on  macroeconomic and  financial policy. The
experiences  in the region confirm global  lessons: dealing with overheating  requires determined,
counter-cyclical  fiscal policies (to counter the potential overheating caused by large capital
inflows),  and better supervision  and tighter  prudential  regulations  on the financial  sector (such as
raising  reserve requirements  on foreign  borrowings). Sterilization  of inflows and exchange  rate
flexibilization  can be effective  in the short-run  to reduce large capital inflows and their impact,
but are usually constrained by quasi-fiscal implications (in the case of sterilization)  and by
competitive  pressures  (in the case  of exchange  rate flexibilization),  e.g., from exporters.
Looking forward, our analysis raises two other issues of  potential concern: fiscal
sustainability  and the quality of domestic financial  intermediation. As already pointed out by
Buiter (1996), some countries appear to  face fiscal sustainability issues, especially when
including  public off-balance  sheet activities. Buiter  highlights  the combination  of high domestic
real interest  rates and the rapid buildup  of domestic  liabilities,  both explicit and implicit  through
the bailking  systems.  We find evidence  here of potential  problems  with fiscal sustainability  from
an external  perspective  as capital  flows are sometimes  associated  with larger fiscal deficits and
high interest rates, a combination  that is seldom  sustainable. For transition  economies,  potential
or hidden liabilities in state-owned  enterprises  (e.g., resulting  from poor governance),  in weak
financial  institutions,  and in insolvent  social security  and health systems  thus need to be carefully
monitored.  The risk otherwise  may  be a sudden  decline  in perceived  creditworthiness,  leading to
a sharp contraction  or reversal  of private flows.
A  second concern relates to the quality of domestic intermediation  of (external and
domestic) funds.  The quality of the financial sectors in transition economies is still weak.
Cross-country  indicators of quality of domestic intermediation  (such as those in the annual
reports of the EBRD) suggest  for some  countries  a limited  institutional  development  and a weak
financial  condition,  including  large  amounts  of non-performing  loans. While  we did not find that
the quality  of financial  intermediation  itself was an important  explanatory  factor of capital  flows,
it would  be useful to further  analyze  the issue of banking  fragility,  also as that has been an issue
in other emerging markets and likely a key policy area.  A particularly  useful area of research
could be to investigate  the interactions  between high domestic credit growth, weak domestic
financial  intermediation  and the type of capital  flows.
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26Table  1. Capital  Flows  to CEE  and  FSU Countries:  Descriptive  Statistics
(% of GDP,  per annum)
Total  Private  Official  FDI  Portfolio  Commercial  Short Term
Capital  Capital  Capital  Debt  Debt
Mean  5.92  3.22  2.70  1.98  0.41  0.85  0.56
Median  4.89  2.11  1.78  1.03  0.00  0.18  0.12
Maximum  21.02  17.48  15.04  17.48  10.15  10.92  13.10
Minimum  -3.12  -1.95  -2.98  0.00  -3.33  -2.98  -10.67
Std. Dev.  4.84  3.73  3.57  2.61  1.66  1.89  2.49Table  2. Size and Composition  of Net Capital  Flows
(millions  of USS)
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997
Central  Europe,  Baltics  and FSU:
,V Source
Private Flows  -4047  4700  13231  18939  14693  31231  32930  41748
Official  Flows  4946  13237  10423  10001  10914  12578  11440  15587
Grants  (excl.  tech. coop.)  640  3924  4718  3683  4895  5217  2479  4269
IMF  328  3641  1836  2045  2352  4745  3325  3400
Long Term DebtFlows  10011  6863  12932  11528  5481  9269  12351  20030
ShortTerm  Debt Flows  -11181  -262  -104  -107  2720  3106  2522  3480
Foreign  DirectInvestment  300  2246  3237  5696  6406  16116  14440  14939
Portfolio  1071  1422  1047  6194  3756  5177  9144  8890
Central  Europe  and Baltics
1!y  Source
f'rivateFlows  749  4179  2538  16018  12448  28072  21111
Official  Flows  585  -5259  4191  3181  4223  4665  2600
Grants  (excl.  tech. coop.)  40  3380  2116  1477  2386  3749  1404
IMF  328  3641  823  206  107  -2723  -795
ASY  Typel  1893  9291  5448  18026  14393  26085  21513
LongTermDebtFlows  974.1  2541  1215.6  6027  3588  8131  6909
Short Term  Debt Flows  -780.5  -761.9  -1144.2  379  2201  3483  2272
loreign Direct  Investment  300  2449  3507  5220  4978  11874  9370
Portfolio  1071  1422  1047  6194  3519  5321  3757
IFormer  Soviet  Union
.Ey  Source
Private  Flows  -4796  521  10693  2921  2245  3159  11818
ODfficial  Flows  4361  7978  6232  6820  6691  7913  8840
Grants  (excl.  tech. coop.)  600  544  2602  2206  2509  1468  1075
IMF  0  0  1013  1839  2245  7468  4120
By Type'  -1363  4619  13500  7329  6321  12328  20269
LongTermDebtFlows  9037  4322  11716  5501  1893  1138  5442
ShortTerm  Debt Flows  -10400  500  1040  -486  518  -377  250
Foreign  Direct  Investment  0  -203  -269  475  1428  4242  5070
Portfolio  0  0  0  0  237  -143  5387
Source:  Global Financial  Development,  World  Bank 1998.  1997  data is preliminary  and is only available
for the whole  region.
1/ Excluding  IMF, grants  and technical  cooperation.Table  3. Non-Equity  Portfolio  Flows  and  Interest  Rate  Differential
Poland  |  Czech  Rep.  |  Slovak  Rep.  |  Hungary  |  Russia  l
1995  1996  I997  1994  1995  1996  1994  1995  199  1994  1995  1996  1994  1995  1996
NonEBquityPortfolio  250  *531  2200  733  12S8  562  218  210  -2641  2124  1729  -1873  -184  -1576  2320
(in  USS  mnillions)
Interest  Rate  Diferential  14.4  7.6  0.2  8.3  15.6  6.1  5.5  19.4  5.1  6.4  4.7  -2.3  na.  22.1  57.5
Note:  *  Breakup  in  bonds  and  equity  flows  is  not  available  for  Poland  for 1997,  figure  reflects  total  portfolio  investmenc.Table 4. Regressions Results - Benchmark  Model
Dependent Variable
Total  Total Private  Official  FDI  Portfolio  Short  Commercial
Flows  Flows  Flows  Term  Debt
Reform  Indext  2.5945  4.0827  -4.2019  0.8901  0.0146  0.5362  1.1191
(2.19)  (16.94)  (-5.53)  (3.07)  (18.39)  (10.91)  (5.51)
E]U-Accession  0.9688  2.3376  1.5104  1.4364
(1.68)  (3.06)  (6.99)  (2.43)
Reserves,.l  -0.1434  -0.0516  0.0572  -0.0359  -0.0023  -0.0261
(-3.59)  (-2.25)  (3.77)  (-3.70)  (-10.84)  (-3.23)
Adj R2 0.44  0.33  0.50  0.25  0.00  0.01  0.07
Nqo.  Obs.  77  77  77  77  77  104  77
,ull  Factors
F  iscal  Balance,. 2 +  ns  +  4  - - - +  +
liscalBalance,  +  ns  +/-  ns  - +  +
Plrivate  Savings,.  - - - - - +
Domestic  Credit  ns  - ns  ns  ns
Official Flows,,  +  +  +  ns  ns
]nterest Rate Differential  ns  ns  ns  ns  +  - ns
PDush  Factors
LIBOR  ns  +  +  +  +  ns  ns
OECD Growth Rate  ns  +  +  +  ns  +  +
Notes:
l. The estimation procedure is Generalized Least Squares with cross section residual variances as weights.
2. ns = no significant; + = positive significant; - = negative significant.
:3. t statistics are in parentheses.
4. Due to a high correlation between reform index and fiscal balance (0.83), the sign of the coefficient for fiscal balance
becomes negative when reform index is dropped from the regression.Table 5. Panel Data Regressions - Extemided  Model
Dependent Variable
Total Flows  Total Private  Official  FDI  Portfolio'  Short Term  Commercial
Flows  Flows  Debt'  Debt'
Reform Index,  2.797  4.506  -0.638  1.472  -3.286  1.665
(3.67)"  (9.82)"  (-0.90)  (6.47)"  (-2.91)"  (1.74)"
EU-Accesion  0.643  2.521  -2.408  1.896
(1.87)'  (3.43)'  (28.59)-  (10.93)'
Reserves,.,  -0.0754  -0.1185  0.0441  -0.0394  -0.0307  -0.0541
(1.70)"  (-6.72)"  (3.02)"  (-5.05)"  (-1.24)  (-2.07)"
Fiscal Balance,.,  0.0478  0.0843  0.0394  -0.0125  0.0976
(2.11)  (2.98)"  (2.70)"  (-1.19)  (2.00)"
Private Savings,.,  -0.0243  -0.0161
(-2.14)  (1.81)
Domestic Credit,  -0.0267
(-13.76)"
Official Flows,.,  0.7074  0.2143  0.2027  0.0760
(9.23)"  (5.26)"  (10.41)"  (1.43)
LIBOR,  -0.3029
(-1.24)
OECD Growth Rate,  0.0912  0.3496
(2.09)"  (2.51)"
Adj R
2 0.49  0.80  0.75  0.46  0.34  0.36  0.92
No. Obs.  74  72  74  74  78  76  76
F value  0.24  1.41  0.73  0.67  3.11  3.00  4.2
Note:
I/ Fixed effects model estimation was used for these type of flows, given that the hypothesis that the country effects are the same
was rejected ( see F values).
* Significant at 10 percent level.
** Significant at 5 percent level.Figure 1. Official  vs Private  Capital Flows
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Fiscal Deficit/GDP (%)Annex 1.  Net Capital Flows to Central Europe and Former Soviet  Union  Countries
(in USS millions)
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
Ceiitral Europe and Baltics
Albaunia
Official Flows  2  340  397  261  161  157  204
Private Flows  270  136  93  196  48  -108  61
olw: 3FDI  0  0  20  58  53  70  90
Portfolio  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Short Tenn Debt  239  107  70  122  3  -178  -31
CommercialDebt  31  28  3  16  -S  0  2
Total Flows  272  476  490  458  209  49  265
USSGNP  2106  1109  673  1825  1986  2478  2750
Total FlowslGNP (%)  12.9  42.9  72.8  25.1  10.5  2.0  9.6
Bulgria
Official Flows  61  545  337  354  715  -214  -42
Private Flows  -66  101  -612  -10  -240  39  -39
olw:  FDI  4  56  42  55  105  90  115
Portfolio  0  0  0  0  -231.8  -65.7  -166.9
Short Term Debt  -24  15  -733  -32  288  113  327
ConmmercialDebt  568  -111  30  S0  -34  -194  -75
Total Flows  -5  646  -275  344  475  -175  -81
USSGNP  19083  10009  10258  10623  9784  12449  9111
Total Flows/GNP(%)  0.0  6.5  -27  3.2  4.9  -1.4  -0.9
Croatia
Official Flows  -96  55  87  19
Private Flows  74  98  Sl  548
olw:  3FDI  74  98  81  349
Portfolio  0  0  0  133
Short Term Debt  55  117  249  -10
Cornmercial Debt  12  99  165  455
Total Flows  -21  153  168  567
USSGNP  11552  14101  17988  19036
Total Flows/GNP(%)  -0.2  1.1  0.9  3.0
Ckech  Republic
Official Flows  -24  1254  648  173  -1075  28  -I
Private Flows  250  1440  -228  3661  3132  8725  6253
o/w:  FDI  207  400  600  564  762  2568  1435
Portfolio  0  183  36  1601  855  1362  726
Short Term Debt  -593  -257  -346  205  886  2250  797
Commercial Debt  669  417  -551  659  757  2507  3124
Total Flows  226  2694  421  3834  2057  8753  6252
USSGNP  31599  24324  27897  31119  36001  47071  54210
TotalFlows/GNP(%)  0.7  11.1  1.5  12.3  5.7  18.6  11.5
Entonia
Official Flows  93  122  46  95  77
Private Flows  104  163  195  200  408
o/lw: FDI  82  162  214  202  150
Portfolio  0  0  -14  -22  145
Short Term Debt  0  0  8  22  77
Commercial Debt  22  0  -13  -1  -4
Total Flows  197  285  242  295  485
US$ GNP  4326  3900  3795  4064  4353
Total Flows/GNP (%/)  4.6  7.3  6.4  7.3  11.1Annex  1. Net Capital  Flows to Central Europe and Former Soviet Union Countries
(in USS  millions)
1990  1991  1992  1 93  1994  1995  1996
Hemgary
Official Flows  431  2071  272  203  56  -902  -790
Private Flows  247  1414  2245  11307  5403  10771  834
o/w: FDI  0  1462  1479  2339  1144  4519  1982
Portfolio  1071  1166  1011  '918  2595  2577  64
ShortTermDebt  -366  -763  109  281  392  806  156
Commercial Debt  -1379  -1617  -1331  .966  -984  775  -428
Total Flows  678  3485  2517  8S5O  5458  9868  44
USSGNP  31641  32073  35994  37410  40104  42876  43411
Total Flows1GNP(%)  2.1  10.9  7.0  22.7  13.6  23.0  0.1
Latvia
official Flows  106  185  127  44  56
Private Flows  43  55  230  359  342
a1w: FDI  29  45  215  245  325
Portfolio  0  0  0  43  0
Short Term  Debt  0  5  1  25  13
Commercial Debt  -9  5  15  3  3
Total Flows  149  240  357  402  397
USS GNP  6365  5i33  5475  4925  5025
Total Flows/GNP (%)  2.3  8.5  6.5  8.2  7.9
Lithumnia
Official Flows  102  248  161  173  189
Private  Flows  12  8o  42  152  736
O/w:  FDI  10  30  31  72  152
Portfolio  0  0  0  4  II
Short  Term Debt  5  2  22  20  107
Commercial Debt  -3  47  -12  56  136
Total Flows  114  3  28  202  325  925
IJSS GNP  11303  7674  7522  7227  7688
Total Flows/GNP  (%)  1.0  4.3  2.7  4.5  12.0
Macedonia
Official Flows  -11  -2  92  86
Private Flows  16  11  -4  93
o/w: FDI  0  24  14  8
Portfolio  0  0  0  0
Short  Term Debt  16  2  -18  85
Commercial  Debt  0  -15  0  0
Total Flows  5  9  88  179
USS GNP  1901  1761  1926  2003
Total Flows/GNP (%)  0.3  0.5  4.6  8.9
Poland
Official Flows  435  3031  1353  95D  2856  1931  913
Private  Flows  104  604  613  203:2  917  4629  5503
o/w:  3FD1  89  291  665  1697  1846  3617  4445
Portfolio  0  0  0  401  143  1171  938
ShortTermDebt  33  69  -97  -109  -436  -637  7
Commercial Debt  -17  244  45  44  -774  227  -103
Total Flows  539  3635  1966  298:2  3773  6560  6416
USSGNP  55620  73621  82702  84701i  91233  118180  134110
Total Flows/GNP(%)  1.0  4.9  2.4  3.5  4.1  5.6  4.8
Romania
Official Flows  22  1045  1466  845  789  425  973
Private Flows  27  226  -14  372  685  1023  2355
o1w:  3FDI  0  37  73  8T  341  417  263
Portfolio  0  0  0  c  1  1  1040
Short Term  Debt  22  78  -227  131  74  337  -488
Cormmercial  Debt  4  III  140  154  269  268  510
Total Flows  49  1271  1452  1217  1474  144S  3328
USSGNP  38400  28847  25026  26229  29955  35424  35107
TotalFlows/GNP(%)  0.1  4.4  5.8  4.6  4.9  4.1  9.5Annex 1. Net Capital Flows to Central Europe and Former Soviet Union Countries
(in US$ millions)
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
Slovakia
Official Flows  -14  560  186  174  312  -11  14
Private  Flows  187  163  -156  976  1214  1153  2557
A/w:  FDI  0  0  0  199  203  183  281
Ponfolio  0  73  0  275  204  264  60
ShortTe-mDebt  -91  -11  75  148  521  478  1232
Commercial  Debt  278  27  -230  80  83  228  604
Total Flows  173  723  30  1150  1526  1142  2571
US$GNP  15497  10811  11757  11984  13652  17322  18919
Total Flows/GNP  (%/6)  1.1  6.7  0.3  9.6  11.2  6.6  13.6
Slovenia
Official Flows  0  -84  -37  -62  -30
Private Flows  113  356  690  840  1495
o/w: FDI  113  112  131  176  186
Portfolio  0  0  -32.5  -13.5  637
ShontTem Debt  0  117  324  16  -I
Commemial  Debt  0  127  267  662  510
Total Flows  113  272  652  778  1465
USS GNP  12367  12622  14493  18873  18713
Total Flows/GNP  (%)  0.9  2.2  4.3  4.1  7.8
Former Soviet Union
Armenia
Official Flows  22  184  256  238  217
Private  Flows  38  -7  8  15  28
o/w: FDI  0  0  8  14  18
Portfblio  0  0  0  0  10
Short  Tem  Debt  38  -7  0  1  0
Commerial Debt  0  0  0  0  0
Total Flows  60  177  264  253  244
USSGNP  1037  998  1168  1443  1621
Total Flows/GNP  (%)  5.8  17.7  22.6  17.5  15.1
A.erbaijan
Official Flows  13  212  263  175
Private  Flows  0  28  277  606
o/w: FDI  0  22  275  601
Portfolio  0  0  0  0
Shorn  Tem Debt  0  6  2  5
Commercial  Debt  0  0  0  0
Total Flows  13  240  540  781
UISSGNp  4738  3865  3751  3595
Total Flows/GNP  (%)  0.3  6.2  14.4  21.7
Belartus
Official Flows  272  477  231  365  71
Private  Flows  173  126  159  159  9
FD/:  FDI  7  10  15  20  18
Ponfolio  0  0  0  0  0
Short Tem  Debt  0  0  55  36  1
Commerial Debt  166  116  89  103  -10
Total Flows  445  603  390  525  80
USS  GNP  30875  26947  22553  21664  22165
Total Flows/GNP  (%)  1.4  2.2  1.7  2.4  0.4
Georgia
Official Flows  5  219  306  245  228
Private Flows  21  -5  482  -438  37
o/w:FDI  0  0  6  8  40
Portfolio  0  °  °  0  0
Short Tem Debt  0  0  470  -446  -3
Commerial Debt  22  -5  6  0  0
Total Flows  26  214  788  -193  265
USS  GNP  5782  4188  3589  4179  4471
Total FlowstGNP  (%)  0.4  5.1  21.9  -4.6  5.9Annex  1. Net Capital  Flows to Central  Europe  and Former  Soviet Union Countries
(in USS  millions)
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
Kazak
Official Flows  12  267  663  546  511
Private  Flows  126  312  458  1228  1416
o/ws:  FDI  100  150  185  940  1110
Portfolio  0  0  0  7  0
Short  Ternm  Debt  9  -9  127  93  2
Commercial  Debt  17  1 1  146  188  105
Total Flows  13S  579  1121  1774  1927
USS GNP  26795  25301  19622  19348  20949
Total Flows/GNP  ('/.)  0.5  2.3  5.7  9.2  9.2
Kyyz  Republc
Official Flows  4  203  205  218  199
Puivate  Flows  0  10  38  100  233
orw: FDI  0  10  38  96  46
Portfolio  0  0  0  2  -2
Short Term Debt  0  0  0  2  6
Commercial  Debt  0  0  0  0  0
Total Flows  4  213  243  318  431
USS  GNP  2260  1971  1406  1534  1673
Total FlowsIGNP(%)  0.2  10.S  16.4  20.7  25.S
Moldova
Official Flows  31  IS5  233  167  83
Private  Flows  17  0  13  79  140
o/w: FDI  17  0  12  64  41
Portfolio  0  0  0  0  0
Short  Tern Debt  0  0  1  0  25
Comnercial Debt  0  0  0  15  74
Total Flows  4S  15  245  246  222
USS  GNP  2823  2960  1878  2053  1774
Total Flows/GNP(%)  1.7  6.2  13.1  12.0  125
Russia
Official Flows  4033  4337  4367  4004  3590  6440  6889
Private Flows  -4486  724  10250  1455  .78  602  6908
o/w: FDI  0  0  0  0  637  2017  2142
Portfolio  310  0  0  0  237  -669  5029
ShortTenmDebt  -10400  500  900  -600  -500  110  -150
Cotmnercial  Debt  5293  529  9350  2055  -418  -46  -54
Total Flows  -453  5061  14617  5459  3512  7050  13077
USS  GNP  577910  540620  424810  383900  320710  351220  432304
Total Flows/GNP (-.)  0.1  0.9  3.4  1.4  1.1  2.0  3.2
Tajikstan
Ofricial Flows  10  25  240  94  105
PrivateFlows  0  68  10  15  1I
o/w:  WDI  0  0  10  15  16
Portfolio  0  0  0  0  0
Shor Term Debt  0  0  0  0  0
Commercial  Debt  0  68  0  0  0
Total Flows  10  93  250  109  121
USS GNP  2984  2933  2163  2146  2030
Total Flows/GNP(%)  0.3  3.2  11.6  5.1  5.9
Turknmestaata
Official Flows  164  62  9  -75
Private Flows  82  94  -58  624
ow:  FDI  0  0  0  108
Portfolio  0  0  0  0
Short Term  Debt  0  s0  -72  269
Conmercial Debt  82  14  -I  247
Total Flows  246  157  -49  548
USS  GNP  5708  4374  4424  4346
Total  FlowslGNP  (I/.)  4.3  3.6  -1.1  12.6Annex 1. Net Capital Flows to Central  Europe and Former  Soviet Union Countries
(in US$  millions)
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996
Ukrtine
Official Flows  625  424  673  1644  1033
Private Flows  462  332  439  530  887
alw.: FDI  0  0  151  257  350
Portfolio  0  0  0  517  350
Short Term Debt  93  38  81  -24  215
Commercial Debt  369  170  214  -17  109
Total Flows  1087  756  1112  2174  1920
USSGNP  91418  69563  51917  48387  43436
Total Flows/GNP(%)  1.2  1 1  2.1  4.5  4.4
Uzberkistan
Official Flows  61  460  -22  454  269
Private  Flows  1  345  405  271  425
olw: FDI  1  102  155  157  169
Portfolio  0  0  0  0  0
Shodrt  Term Debt  0  92  199  -79  -120
Commercial Debt  0  151  51  193  376
Total Flows  62  805  383  725  694
US$GNP  20177  21880  22996  23110  23907
Total Flows/GNP(%)  0.3  3.7  1.7  3.1  2.9
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